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SOURCES METHODSEXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2006

VIA: AIR  
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA ROUTE)

SECURITY INFORMATION

WATCH NO. MGMA 08663

**SECRET**

CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, SR  
Chief, EE  
FROM : Chief of Station, Frankfurt

DATE: 14 March 1952

SUBJECT: GENERAL REDSOX/LCHOMELY

NOT SUITABLE FOR MICROFILM

SPECIFIC: Mario K. Giordano's Discussion of his Experiences and Background  
in the Abwehr.

After writing a summary of his experiences in the Abwehr at our request, submitted here as attachment A, Mario K. Giordano was given a list of specific and general questions pertaining to his report. His answers to the specific questions (quoted below) are submitted as attachment B:

1. Reconsider and discuss use of lie detector.
2. a. In regards to w/t training do you think it is feasible for us to instruct agents in the construction of simple sets inside from parts smuggled in and/or purchased locally?  
b. What part of the technical aspects of w/t can you teach and whom do you have in mind as an instructor?
3. Re page 2, what was the mission of the two big Estonian teams and what training was given them? Why were the teams so large? How did they operate inside?
4. Re paragraph c of suggested schedule, work out in more detail basic principles of clandestine operations, i.e., non w/t communications, live letter drops, dead letter drops, couriers, cut-outs, evasion of surveillance, MGB interrogation methods, etc.
5. By whom and how was screening of candidates for agent operations carried out by the Abwehr? How were the candidates housed?
6. How could the legends and documentation be furnished by a completely different unit from that training the agents and from the unit planning the missions.
7. Were no special authenticators used by the agent to hand to the jump master after recognizing the drop zone?

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Attachment C contains Giordano's answers to more general questions regarding the methods of the Abwehr and Giordano's comments on these methods. The questions given to Giordano on this subject are as follows:

1. Inefficiencies of the German intelligence, where and why they occurred, how they could have been avoided, and what the ideal solution would have been in your opinion.
2. Types of missions assigned to the various groups, specific training which was given the groups in order to carry out these assignments.
3. Problems of handling Russian personnel, and methods of avoiding or solving these problems.
4. Problems of handling non-Russian personnel, differentiating between Latvian and Estonian.
5. Methods of indoctrination of Russian personnel.
6. Methods of analysis of w/t traffic for authenticity, control signs used.

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as a vector.

Used with such a person this procedure may influence the mind of the candidate even positively, if he is a honest person. Seeing that the Organization is in existence and some exciting possibilities in mind performance of the organization is a reasonable worker he has to be a little bit suspect everybody. Such a person will care he himself has been a part of some in certain. But he really may suspect a person who will the person with whom he will have to work together. I think there will be no serious misunderstandings between them. I think it is better when we are standing of the company and the worker and work. As we really believe to our organization and we have not got any more reason, on that side we understand and direct of a person who will be sure as they would be the same with a little better young man who will together as they go to the place. It still will have a good and happy and happy and happy and happy.

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When we lay together candidates who have undergone the lie detector test with those who do not know anything of the existence of such a device, we can not rely too much on the promise of keeping silence. Let the latter ones be protected by their ignorance. Provide that those who have undergone this test do not realize that this was not a common ruling (which it was not), that not all the candidates had to undergo it: the feeling of being suspected and therefore specially checked may offend them very much.

If we will apply the lie detector with the candidates then we have to warn them that the MGB may use such devices too, although we have never heard of that and we do not believe in that.

As to the 6 Estonians in our reserve I do not think that it is, on principle, necessary to let them undergo the lie detector test. Two of them are quite young men who left Estonia as youngsters of 15 - 16 years. The others have fought against the communists voluntarily for years. Most of them are members of the Estonian Boy-Scouts or Karkiste, which both were strictly Estonian-minded and anti-communist organizations. We could try to check their loyalty and motivation by repeated demands for written life and repeated talks over appropriate subjects. The Estonians are mostly helpless if they have to lie and therefore it could not be too difficult to detect the liars between them.

13 December 1951

*Ad. H.*

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(2)  
Teaching wireless.

It is not feasible for us to instruct agents in construction of simple sets inside, from parts smuggled in or purchased locally. That instructing would require much time, and there would be no special use of it, because:

- the difficulties in smuggling in different parts or complete sets of W/T are approximately the same, and
- there will be hardly any possibility to buy such parts locally without exposing the agent to a special danger, because the trade with W/T parts and all kind of radio equipment, I believe, is under most effective control of the MGB.

The agents must be taught to be able to manipulate their wireless sets not only until these will be in full order, but also to recognize some smaller occasional defects in their sets. Therefore they must know the principle of work of the set, they must know to follow the blue-print of their sets, and i.e., to fasten a damaged or loose wire on the right place. The German W/T sets which were used by the agents, needed often some little repair, especially in their filament and plate supply.

As instructors who could be reached and, perhaps, convinced for cooperation at easiest, I think of: *no 20!*  
 Mr. Minkel, *no 20!* SIMMO and Mr. Heinar, ROSENFELDT, both Estonians who jumped in Estonia in 1941 (Rosenfeldt twice). Age approx. 30. Simmo studied in 1950 in the Technical Institute in Stockholm. Rosenfeldt served as a W/T operator on S/S "Merida" or "Merila", his agency's address being: "Estoco", Skeppsbron 16, Stockholm. In 1942 and 1943 I employed them as operators of one of our home-stations with good results. I was in very good terms with both of them and I think them to be reliable and able to all kind of wireless teaching and traffic.

That little technical teaching of agents what we need, I can do myself, too, if there will be no other more qualified teachers available, and if the technical descriptions of the sets, which we will have to use, will be available.

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(3)  
The TWO Big Estonian Teams.

The German command was very much interested in reliable information concerning the traffic, transports and loads, on the important railway line Archangelsk - Vologda - Moscow.

There was also a great need of reliable meteorologic information from some far point of North Russia.

It was felt that some Russian single agents or small Russian groups, which could legalize themselves, would not be sure and reliable enough for that work of great importance and precision. Therefore it was decided to send a Finnish or an Estonian group.

A lot of enthusiastic Estonians, all eager to help their relatives deported from Estonia to Russia, was just available at that time. Thus it was decided to use some of these men whose reliability was guaranteed, of whom there was no fear that they would mix with the local population and give off their work.

The photographic survey of the region foreseen for this enterprise, made extra for the enterprise, showed virgin forests with many signs of forestry work along the railway line. No possibilities for local alimentation of the group were found. Thus the alimentation had to be done by airplanes.

To avoid alerting the Russian watch system it was decided to launch the men in the forest far away from the railway. There they had to organize some depots and from there smaller groups had to go on the real work on the railway line. The food had to be carried from these depots over tens of miles through the forest without any ways to the scouts on work on the railway. For these long marches with heavy loads during a long period of time (at least 2 months work was foreseen) the teams had to be so big (7-8 men each).

Both teams, although knowing from each other, had to work separately, providing a possibility for checking the news. They had to stay in contact (by wireless) for safety reasons only (they were prepared to fight if needed).

The teams were subdivided into groups of 3-4 men with their own wireless sets, so that every group could always remain in contact with the home station and with the other groups. The wireless traffic was strictly limited to the minimum. Special codes were used to shorten the messages.

The training consisted mainly in wireless, use of different special codes (one for reporting over the railway traffic, one for the meteorologic informations and a third one for general use). The other very extended training was given by the Finnish in orientation and long marches in virgin forests without any ways and any special artificial orientation points, life in such a forest, especially in winter time, all under permanent readiness to fight the suddenly attacking enemy.

Thus there were practically 4 groups, two of them on reconnaissance work, two others on supply work. Reporting was done usually once a day over the railway and once, or in some periods, twice the day over the meteorologic conditions.

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About the Basic Principles of Clandestine Operations.

(Question No 2.)

Sorry to state that I have no experiences ~~of~~ myself in matters like the use of letterdrops, couriers, cut-outs a.s.o. These were not used in connection with the agents I was contacted to. Therefore all I could say is a mere theoretical reflection.

One single agent can not do much if not helped by other persons. So he has to look <sup>for</sup> and to find reliable people who could help him as:

- 1) informants,
- 2) live letter drops,
- 3) couriers.

The lesser the contact between the named helpers themselves, and the lesser they know about the agent, the better it is for the safety of all of them.

An INFORMANT, if he does not stand in direct personal contact to the agent, may know one live letter drop only. In case of direct personal contact between the informant and the agent it would be good if the address of the agent remains unknown to the informant. But his address will be known to the agent, or the agent will know how to contact him.

Every next meeting of the agent with his informant has to be held on different place and at different time.

It is dangerous to agree upon a meeting by phone. If one can not avoid doing so, then use of some conventional expressions, agreed upon earlier, is advisable, e.g. never tell the real time of meeting, but add ( or subtract) some days and hours to (from) the real time. Do the same concerning the place of meeting. If one says, e.g. "on the same place where we met the last time" then that may not mean really on the same place, but, if so agreed upon, - on the place which was chosen for the next meeting the last time. Never forget that the phones are mostly under sharp control and therefore, if ever possible, don't use them, even not for such conventional talks as shown above, because - using the phone one

- 1) one reveals to the controlling officer the person with whom one is in contact ( if the person on the other end is not one to whom one speaks regularly or usually in real business matters, too)
- 2) One's conventional talk may strike the used ear of the controller, and make oneself and one's partner suspected. -2-

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The abovementioned conventional talks would have brought a "shadow" behind the person who talked in phone, to get out where he will go and whom he will meet. If he then will remain on his place during the time mentioned in the tele-conversation for the meeting, then, doing so, he reveals that he had some conventional talk, and thus he helped to tighten the suspicion the controller got when listening to his tele-conversation.

If one, eventhough, has to use the phone, so one has to try to elaborate the message in a way that it really will appear to the controller as a quite regular and usual businesstalk or message one makes often, and the person to be contacted usually receives. A bad cover is worse than the plain talk!

A LIVE LETTER DROP has to know the authenticators only, identifying the persons from whom he may accept and to whom he may hand over a message or an effect. If he does not act as a courier, too, then no addresses of the informants or of the agent have to be given to him. He may know addresses of one or two couriers only, or of a dead letter drop where to deliver what he will receive.

A DEAD LETTER DROP must be shown on the very place to the person who will have to use it. Oral explanations, or even plans, are unsufficient and may cause misunderstandings. The place for a dead letter drop must be chosen very carefully, so it could be

- 1) found easily; it can not be bound with a heap of hay or something else what can be removed or destroyed easily and soon, after removal of which one could not find out the letter drop any longer.
- 2) approached unstrikingly, even during the day time, and without letting behind special traces.
- 3) NOT found by chance by the playing children.

I dug my secret documents into the earth on two places before I came through the front line on 4 May, 1945. Later in July or August, 1945, having asked many times for the permission to dig these papers out, I was asked to explain and to describe the places and to draw plans of them. I did both, but my papers were not found, although I think to have given good information and drawn good plans. I had to go to the places and to find the exact spots myself. I found the papers on one place at once, but on the second place even I could not find them any longer, although I knew precisely the spot where I laid them. I had put the ~~papers~~ tin with cigaret-

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be done to avoid each circling of airplanes which unavoidably attracts the attention of the watch organizations to that area. 08663

The means of landing, be these parachutes or something else, have to be of a kind enabling the agents to get rid of them after landing as soon as possible, with the least possible loss of time for, and the least possible traces of, destructing or hiding them.

As to the wireless communication, all has to be done so the surveillance organization could not receive any hints concerning the whereabouts of the agent from their radio-goniometric service. If short wave transmitters are used, then these must be fitted out with special directing areas minimizing the possible success of the goniometer stations.

The ciphers and codes to be used must help to shorten the messages as much as ever possible. The use of photo-radio (video) is highly recommended.

If that will be impossible, then the use of ultra short waves has to be taken under due consideration despite the technical difficulties which arise because of the long distances to be covered.

The security of an agent is of greatest importance for the organization, - not only because of the pity we feel for an agent, but also, and in first order because of the great troubles, and difficulties, and loss of time, and expenses, the organization will have before a new agent can continue the interrupted work of an other agent whom the organization lost because of its own carelessness or its arrear in modern technics.

Tracing dogs are often used by the Russian watch organizations. Precautions must be taken to defend the agents against such dogs. The Finnish supplied the agents during world war II with special drugs, which, spread on the traces of an agent, paralysed the smell of a dog.

Other, natural ways of losing the smelly trace have to be used by the agents, too, e.g. going through water.

One has to remember that one's smell is not bound to the shoes only, but mostly to one's body and the clothing. Therefore, when trying to lose one's trace, especially when going through water for that very reason, one may not touch trees, bushes or grass, not only with the bare hand, but also not by the clothing.

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tes and my papers. Under a great heap of brushwood, being sure that the farmer will have no time and no need to move that heap in some few weeks, in which time I hoped to be able to collect my papers. But when I was brought to that farm late in July or in August, then there was no that heap any longer. The farmer had reshaped the heap of brushwood, and my papers were lost for ever, may be burned together with the rubbish remained after the old heap was rebuilt, or found by the children and thrown away. -

Some special signs must be fixed, showing to the person who has to collect the messages from a live or dead letter drop, whether there is something to be collected, so he will not have to approach it and let behind traces unnecessarily, and in case of a live letter drop, - whether "the air is clear", whether there is no special danger in approaching the letter drop.

The COURIERS have the most chances to be remarked by some watch organization, as they have to cover long distances and remain thus long times in watched areas. Therefore use of old defective people and women, or appropriate camouflage is suggested, so their appearance would not strike anybody. A courier has to overgive his messages generally to a live letter drop, but not to the agent directly. It is better if he will know nothing at all concerning the agent for whom he really is working. If the courier is not known to the live letter drop personally, and even if he is known, use of special, periodically changed authenticators is advised.

#### Evasion of Surveillance.

Different watch systems of the enemy are permanently on the alert and so the surveillance after an agent starts from the very first moment ~~when~~ he appears in the enemy area. To evade that surveillance, the first and very essential steps have to be done by the organization which sends the agent out.

The difficult conditions of move from and to the Baltic states obliges us to use air communication for sending the agents in, and the wireless for transmitting their messages.

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The danger of circling of an airplane over the area for letting the agents jump not too far from each other, or after the agent has just jumped, has been discussed already (see: Special Authenticators" -17 Dec. 1951). Everything possible has to

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Smoking is dangerous. The smell of a cigarette or of a pipe may discover one's good hiding place easily. It is especially dangerous to smoke tobacco which is uncommon in the country where the agent is working.

Once during the tuition period some Russian volunteers had to hide themselves and to observe the traffic on one highway. Many groups were detected by the instructors because of the insufficient camouflage. But one group of two men could not be found, they having masked themselves so carefully. But then, suddenly one of the instructors smelled the slight odor of a "machhorca" cigarette, a kind of tobacco which was quite uncommon in Estonia, and was used by the Russians only. Revealed by that special smell, that group, although masked against the visual surveillance perfectly, was detected soon after one of the men lit his cigarette.

An agent avoids quarreling. Even if not inflicted himself, it is very dangerous to remain in the neighborhood of any quarrel or accident: the militiamen will be there soon, and all the people present will have to show their identity papers, or even to follow the militiamen to the police station, and that is always dangerous for an agent, especially for an illegal one. Therefore one has to try to disappear as soon and as quietly as possible from a place where some quarrel is coming on, never stop on the street when an accident occurs, even not for helping the injured people, although one would like to help. One may very easily be asked to give one's data as a witness, and it is always dangerous to do that.

Specially controlled areas, bridges and crossing points of highways, where the passers are often controlled and checked, have to be avoided. If one has to take such a way then one has to get assured before, that there is no checking being done at that time. One has to have the "eyes open" but do if remarking nothing, and to be ready to change one's way unstrikingly as soon as one remarks a need for that.

Curiosity is always dangerous! Therefore never try to enter any closed or restricted area if it is not needed, because of the curiosity only.

Legalization in Estonia is very difficult. During the peace time already there were special address cards in towns in every police station, and in every rural district office for every person living in the area. If somebody changed his address then that change was registered on his card and in his passport or identity card. If somebody came from an other area and the registering officer got some suspicion on his person, he had the very simple and easy way

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for a check by calling that police station or rural district office in whose area the person claimed to have lived and worked earlier. It would be unwise to think that the Soviet-Estonian militia and the special security organizations in Estonia do not use the same system.

If one really likes to legalize, using the legend of a person who was born and has lived in Estonia all the time, then one must have the identity papers on the name of a person still in Estonia now, and these papers must bear all the different stamps indicating the places where he has been living and working since the issuance to "him" of that document, and these stamps must correspond to the remarks on the personal address cards of that person in corresponding registering offices. That could be done if the real owner of such a document agrees to overgive his document to our men, goes himself "under ground" for some time during which our agent can use his identity and his real legend - real life history.

The officers who came from some district of the immense Russia and know well and inform us consciously about the methods applied by the MGB and other security organizations in those districts, and who therefore think that it is possible to legalize oneself in Soviet Russia, may not be aware and may have no imagination of the difficulties which an agent may have to win in one of the Baltic states (especially in Estonia and in Latvia), where the density of population is much greater, where the political tensions are quite different than these in Russia, and where therefore the meshes of the surveillance net are much more narrow than in Russia. Therefore, the best way to evade the surveillance is to live illegally, to find reliable persons who will supply one with information (or also with their own identity documents for ~~perma~~ short periods), avoid any contact with the authorities and the people one just does not need to contact. Change one's whereabouts as often as possible and before one gets in trouble with his helpers, who will be as nervous as an agent himself may be. Never tell the old landlord the place one is going to, so the pursuers, once reaching the old place of stay, could not find any hints about the new hiding place. Don't use liquor or any other drugs intoxicating the senses. Be cautious with the opposite sex whom one does not know well, because the communists use often the help of sex appeal in their surveillance work.

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Screening in Special Camp.

The volunteers selected between the POWs were brought to an old estate situated on a peninsula in a restricted area. That camp was headed by one German or Estonian officer who spoke Russian. The commandant had at his disposal a Russian staff composed of the camp-elder, his assistants, different teachers and room-elders. There was also a group of Russian camp workers and some 2 or 3 German soldiers, mostly occupied with the household of the camp, and the office work. There was also a camp-guard, composed of Russians, but that was more or less of moral meaning only. The candidates were not allowed to leave the camp but they could take walks in the large forest-like garden of the estate.

The candidates were at first freed from their dirty clothings of POW, had a bath, got clean clothes and good nourishment.

They were housed in small rooms, 6 - 10 men in each. Each room had an "elder" belonging to the camp staff (Russian). That elder had to learn the individual qualities, the character and the political reliability of the inhabitants of his room.

The candidates had to do some physical exercises, some household work and to hear some lectures on different political themes. They had to write their life-histories and to undergo some simple intelligence tests, especially for finding out whether they were able to learn wireless or not.

During all these lectures, works and free time the the Russian camp-elder, supported by his assistants, teachers, room-elders and some trustees between the Russian camp workers, tried to find out who of the candidates were reliable and suitable for being taught as agents, which were reliable but unable for agents and could be employed as workers in camps and which were to be sent back to the POW camps.

There were no special technical devices applied and all the political liability work consisted of checking of the impressions the members of the camp staff had received from one or another candidate.

The decisions concerning returning of candidates to the POW camps were made by the chief of the unit, whereas the decisions concerning the division of the candidates into agents and camp workers were taken by the camp commandant.

I personally had not much to do with that camp and therefore my knowledge of the methods applied in that camp may be too superficial, but it seemed to me that besides the good physical and psychotechnic screening the political screening was too weak and many men had to be sent away as unreliable much later, from the real instruction camps already.

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(6) The Legends and Documentation.

The relatively small units which trained the agents and planned the missions, were not able to furnish the agents with good legends and with documents. Therefore that was made by special centrals, the G-Staffel's which collected all necessary information and different documents.

It was generally supposed that the way and especially the great retreat of the Red Army in 1941 had created in Russia such a confusion and disorder that every Russian, having some kind of military document and wearing an uniform, could be able for sure travelling and stay on different places during a relatively long time.

The G-Staffel, or the corresponding Finnish unit, was informed in due time of the missions and of the real life-stories of the agents foreseen for that mission. On base of these data the G-Staffel composed a simple legend, i.e. of convalescent soldiers or officers of the Red Army returning from some hospital to their unit, or of some duty journey from the unit to a higher H.Q. and return. The G-Staffel had usually enough information concerning the dislocation of Russian units, H.Q.s and hospitals in the appropriate area, and also enough different original documents withdrawn from the Pows. When the G-Staffel had studied the case and made some suggestions concerning the legend to be used, then the agents in question were sent to the Staffel and the legends were discussed with them. If it appeared that the legends did not suite to the agents, then new variants were elaborated until the workers of the Staffel and the agents, too, were satisfied.

I do not find that that way of working out the legends and the documentation would be false, especially if enough time and care were given for that work. Such a central has usually better possibilities to collect needed information and supplies of documents than a small unit has. Usually such a central unit was located near a higher H.Q. where from it got fluently all the incoming information and also the original documents (therefore it often sent his officers to the areas where greater quantities of Pows were made).

The Estonian groups sent in 1941 from Finland to Estonia and the two Estonian groups sent to Russia, did not need any legends and special documents, as they had to remain clandestine before the Russians and the communists. They even wore Finnish uniforms, as they were all enlisted in the Finnish Army.

The last 5 Estonian groups sent in 1945 to Estonia had good original or well forged old Estonian documents. It was a period of great moves of the inhabitants and it was hoped that the agents may find some possibilities to legalize themselves with the help of these papers and their old good relations.

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(7) Special Authenticators.

No special authenticators from the agent to the "old man", overgiven by the agent to the jumpmaster after he recognizes the drop zone, were used in the units where I worked.

Such authenticators could not be used under conditions in which the preparations for dropping were made. Usually it was the very first flight that the agent took when he was dropped. The flights were executed in night time so that the experienced pilot had just enough of the dim light to recognize the drop zone. It would surely have taken a lot of time and many flights in circle until the excited and unexperienced agent could have recognized the drop zone, which he might know personally well, but from which he never had seen an air-photograph, if he had seen any air-photos at all.

In my practice I know one case only where agents were given the possibility to study the air-photographs of the drop zone, that of the two Estonian teams sent to Russia. These men were able to recognize the area and they later reported their drop zone with great exactitude.

Use of such authenticators could be allowed only if the agents are duly taught in recognizing the route of the flight and the drop zone by normal altitude and speed of flight without causing any circling in the drop zone.

It must be tried to drop the agents on the first and single flight over the drop area. Every circling of an unknown airplane over an area during night time will be signaled to the corresponding security authorities at once, and the agents dropped during that circling flight may await very unpleasant visitors on the next morning or day already. That was the case with many Russian agents in Estonia in 1943 and 1944 which were discovered because of such circling of airplanes over the drop zone.

17 Dec 1951.

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ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONS RISEN IN CONNECTION WITH  
THE WRITING " MY EXPERIENCES ", OF 30 NOV 1951.

1. Inefficiencies of the German intelligence, where and why they occurred, how they could have been avoided, and what the ideal solution would have been in your opinion?

In e f f i c i e n c i e s .

A. Lack of sound policy.

There are two groups of stimuli for the agents: the materialistic, and the idealistic or psychic ones.

The Germans made use of both groups of stimuli when looking for, and indoctrinating the recruits, which were volunteers only.

There was no difficulty in finding volunteers for agents between the Pows. The majority of them was ready to go to any camp for special training where better accommodation and better food was promised. This was easy to do, as the standard of life in the German Pow camps was a very low one.

Nor was there difficulty on the psychic side. The majority of the volunteers had never been active and profiteering communists. They had had a bad time under the communists. They had seen themselves the powerful German offensive and the defeat of the Red Army, during 1941. They knew the German armies being far in Russia. They saw the great and bright-coloured posters with good slogans about the freedom and private ownership after the communists will be beaten. They heard many talks about the German general victory which had to be coming soon. They saw the wealthiness of the country where they stood and the happiness of the inhabitants recently freed from the communist terror. They saw the great destruction and devastation caused by the communists, and wondered how wealthy and prosperous the country must have been before the communist occupation, in peace time.

The Russians are credulous in general, and therefore many of them believed into these talks and posters which seemed to speak the same talk which they saw themselves when looking at the life in country of their stay. Many of them thought really to work for a good cause if trying to help to free his own country from the communists as soon as possible, so the war would be out and they might return to their freed homes. The men had not yet been long time away from the Soviets. They knew the Soviet life and the disorder caused by the war events perfectly. They were self-

confident that it will be difficult or dangerous for them

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to go back as agents and work for the short period of time until the Germans will reach the regions they were sent in, or until the soonly expected collapse of the communist regiment under the German blows.

Thus the materialistic and the idealistic or psychic stimuli worked exactly in the same one direction, there were seemingly no controversy between them, they were so well united that an agent-volunteer even did not need to ask himself whether he was acting for the idealistic or materialistic reasons.

But this situation did not last for long. Rumors were whispered about the ferocities of the Nazi-Germans in the Ukraine and in the other "freed" Russian districts. The recruits saw the mood of the local inhabitants getting more and more disillusioned, as they did not get back their "freedom" and their land, their houses and factories.

The hesitations started in the soul of many volunteers: what is right and true, the rumors about the ferocities of the Nazis in the "freed" countries, the rumors about the first victories of the Red Army over the Germans, - or - the shining posters speaking from the freedom and private ownership and the general and total defeat of the Red Army, still on the walls of their living- and tuition-rooms? As a result of that hesitation the men lost their self-confidence and conviction they would have needed for successful work.

B. Lack of duly qualified officers.

The German command had many very good officers of intelligence service who realized the difficulties depending on the difference between the Nazi politics and the foundation on which they had to build their Russian-antisoviet work. These officers had a very bad and hard task because they could not go openly against the stupid Nazi-policy. But besides these good officers there were others, too, who did not care much of the real results of their work. They wanted only to have sent some agents out, so they could show in their reports that they had done some work. And if these agents did not report, then - who could say that just these officers and their inadequate work were guilty of the failure? It is useless to await good results in intelligence work if such officers are in lead. Often very lively and energetic, interested in good living - eating, women and drinking, they may render good service in some special circumstances, but they were of no

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use, they were a plague in the units which had to work with the Russians and other nationalities in East Europe, where the work had to be done mainly on the psychic and idealistic basis. I do not know of any attempt of the Germans to send to Russia anybody for money, thus on the material stimuli only. In the beginning of W. War II there seemed not to be any need for this, as there were enough of good ideologic volunteers. Later the fragility of German own position did not promote such a practice.

There were other German officers, who gave their best for the work, but though, could not book good results, because they did not know Russian, and could therefore not establish the warmth and friendliness which is highly needed in this work.

There were no such difficulties, especially what to the ~~an~~ ignorance of the language and the politics, with the Estonian recruits in 1941 and 1942. The German officer in lead of the unit knew himself Estonia well and liked to help the Estonians. He was in good contact with the recruits and with the Estonian officers who had to lead these men immediately. In 1944/1945, too, the German officer in command was wise enough not to mix into the pure Estonian stimulating motives of work of the recruits.

Some throw-backs which happened even to the good German officers, which troubled the sentiments of the recruits, and which could be avoided:

During a farewell party given to the Estonian agents before the departure of two of them (end of 1944) the German commander had the best intention to show his camaraderie. He emptied his glass many times, to the prosperity of Estonia, of the departing men a.s.o. He got tipsy and wanted to wrestle with one of the departing men who sat on his side and, having taken not a single drink, seemed to be worried. The German officer thought to cheer him. He grasped the man by the hair and asked him to do the same with him. This, of course, could have been a very good gesture if done to an other, tipsy man, but not to a man who was absolutely sober, who found the drunken party a nonsense, whose mind was full of thoughts about the beforestanding departure and very earnest work. This man looked at me and asked how he had to behave? The other Estonians advised: "Show him what an Estonian can!" It was not easy for me to clear the situation, and especially the bad impression this party left to the both departing men.

Sometimes it happened that the officers had gatherings of their own in the same house where the recruits lived and worked. In some occasions I had to participate myself on such parties, although I understood the wrongness of such gatherings in the sight of the recruits, giving them the possibility to look at the tipsy, if not drunken, officers and their girl-friends, the same officers being later on on the follow-

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ing day unable to lead the scheduled exercises. The recruits, prepared to go on work and to sacrifice their lives, usually think themselves to be of more value to the enterprise, and therefore also entitled to some more pleasant entertainment during the tuition period, than the men and officers remaining behind in their warm offices and living rooms surrounded by good friends, whereas the agents will have nothing but a perpetual hiding awaiting them, being chased without pity... And these recruits had no much possibilities for such pleasant parties.

An other bad habit of the German officers was the use of alien female staff in the units. This was disliked by the Russian as well as by the Estonian agents, especially if these women were of their own nationality, and besides their official duties, if there were any, had some special relations to the German officers of the unit.

Some more illustrations to show with which difficulties the German officers had to fight in their own organization.

Much stress was laid on reporting of work and "success" to the superiors. This was done not only by the good-for-nothings, but by the best officers, too.

Once, having received a message from one of our few agents who reported and whose information was reliable, I forwarded the message to all the authorities who, as to my understanding, could have some interest for, and some use of, this message of purely local significance. Later, when I reported this to my German chief and when he understood that the message was not forwarded to Berlin H.Q. too, I had a bad talk with him - I trying to defend myself arguing that there was no sense to send the message to Berlin, because there would have been no use of it there, that this would have been a further unnecessary overcharging of the communication lines, and the chief - there was a great sense to send this message, although not of any military use to Berlin: Berlin would have seen that we were still working and having positive results, too, that we were not only wasting money and material. This had to be done as quickly as ever possible, so no other unit could bring the same information earlier than we.

It seems to me that such a formalism and bureaucracy was caused by the unsound competition between the Wehrmacht- and the Nazi Party-Intelligence Services, the last one trying to disclose and to prove the inability of the firstmentioned one. The Wehrmacht-people had to defend themselves and therefore they had to report to Berlin every small success, too, so the highest chief of the Service could defend his organization before the political adversaries.

A proof of this fight and the human fairness of some German Wehrmacht officers and of the unfairness of some other ones were given by the following events:

It was in July or August, 1941. My German chief received a top-secret ciphered message from Berlin H.Q. He trusted me fully, may be more than some of his German officers from whom

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he could not know who was an "eye" of the Nazi organization watching after him. Thus he asked me to help him in deciphering the message. It was a strict order not to supply with weapons any longer the Estonian agents sent by us from Finland to Estonia. The reason was purely political. These agents had gathered around themselves great groups of Estonian fighters and were helping very successfully in liberation of North-Estonia from the communists. It was feared that the Estonians, and not the Germans, would free Tallinn, the capital of Estonia, and that the Estonians, then would have too good reasons to demand the political independence and the restoration of the Estonian Republic. The reaction of my chief was: The matter remains top-secret, even closed before the German officers of the unit, not a single word could be told of it either to a German, not to an Estonian in- or outside the unit. The order has to be carried out, but the Estonians in fights, must be helped, too. Thus the decision: we do not supply them with weapons any longer as ordered, and of which they have received plenty already. We shall use all our possibilities to supply them with munition to the weapons they had received, and what they needed more than supplementary weapons. This was not been forbidden, and this was done!

A few days later we received a message <sup>from</sup> of one of these agents, who at that time was detached to the German liaison officer of one Estonian shock-troop which, too, was sent out by our unit. The message, signed by this German officer, asked for weapons into a region which, as to our information, ~~had~~ <sup>was</sup> cleared from the communist some days ago already, and was reached by the ordinary German front-troops advancing from South-Estonia. I made an identity check of the operating agent and of the signature of the officer in question. The answers were unclear and unsatisfactory in both cases. The agent gave his name "Rosenfeld", whereas the right name of our man was "Rosenfeldt". The answer of the German officer was also not much better. We worried very much, thinking that our people have been beaten by the communists and that these have received the secret data about our wireless and ciphers. So our answer was something like: ask for weapons ~~by~~ your local superiors. It took us many more messages to and from before we could clear the case. The German liaison officer was indeed in contact with the German troops, and liked to make a joke only, as he declared it later. It was only much later when I heard from my men, after Estonia was freed and we were together in Tallinn, that the mentioned liaison officer had received a copy of the beforementioned top-secret order forbidding the supply of weapons, directly from Berlin, over the first German troops he met in Estonia. And that ~~cleared~~ the "joke" he wanted to prepare us, as he was not informed of this order by us! This "perfect" officer had the mishap to forget all his secret and personal papers when surprised by a Russian errant patrol. Later the Estonians, having cleared the mess, found the lieutenant's case, and as it was of Russian origin, so they thought it to belong to somebody of the Russian patrol, and were eager to see what it contained. There they found the copy of this ominous order, too, between other papers of their own German liaison officer and quasi chief, as he did not recognize the authority of the Estonian colonel who was the real leader of the troop. I think, no further comments are needed here! The relations between the Estonian fighters and their Nazi-minded German "liaison officer" were not fostered by any accidents.

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C. Wrong treatment of alien officers.

The German units of Intelligence Service which were placed in Estonia, used the help of many Estonian and also of some old imperial-Russian officers for teaching Russian and Estonian recruits. These experienced officers could help very much, and they were disposed to do so, but their life was often made so difficult and they were put into such a ridiculous situation, that they often did not know whether they were still officers, or ranks, or even civilians; they did not know what they had to do, what was forbidden for them to do, whose orders they had to obey.

Partly this was due to the Nazi-politics and policy liking to suffocate every possible rise of the nationality of the "freed" nations, but mostly, and the worst conditions were caused by the abovementioned officers who were not interested in work themselves, who in their German pride did not bother to understand the psychology of the alien officers from whom they themselves awaited all the work being done. It may be clear that the Germans could not take the ExPows, whom they used as instructors, with full trust, but those Estonian or old-Russian officers had not fought against the Germans during World War II, they had to carry out the work of highly qualified and trusted officers, being in the same time treated often worse than even the ExPows-instructors.

The moral depression of these officers was great. Many of them lost the belief of helping his own country by that work, lost the interest for it and did just enough to justify his stay with the unit and to receive the food, which was very scarce in those days in Estonia.

A good Estonian, an elder officer of Estonian Navy, succeeded to escape the communist occupation and terror by "repatriation" to Germany in January, 1941. This was possible because his wife belonged to a German parish. A few months later he was asked by one of his German friends, whom he learned to know during his service in Estonian Navy, to help with his valuable knowledge to free Estonia. As a good Estonian, he could not refuse, and he helped very much. Officially his position was intricate: he was not enlisted into the German Army or Navy as a German officer. Nor was he recognized as an Estonian officer, as he, when "repatriating," had to take German citizenship. He had to wear a phantasy "dolmetscher" uniform, unknown to the troops, and was therefore often taken for a "forester". But he was protected by his old good friend, who took him unofficially as an old Estonian officer, and he did his very qualified work. Later, when he had to work for one of the "uninterested" German officer, far from his old protecting friend who had engaged him, his conditions of life were very bad. He continued to give the best what he could. But the depression, together with the repeated loss of the homeland in autumn 1944, and the grief because of his

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family for which he could not care duly, had thought the man so far down, that he suicided in February 1945.

That second- or third-rate treatment was quite wrong also because of the influence this had on the Russian recruits whom these aliens had to teach. It went so far that the recruits did not obey to these officers, and that the soviet-Russian instructors went with petitions and accusations to the German officers for getting rid of these hated "thirds" between the two "great friends", the Germans and the Russians. It is quite clear that the results of work of these officers could not be of the same good standard of which they would have been if they were treated in accordance with the work they had to do.

I had a little better treatment than other Estonian officers because of my position as a Finnish captain detached to the Germans. I profited also of the special respect the soviet-Russians had for the Finnish from the time of Winter War 1939/1940. But for me, too, the situation was all but agreeable and stimulating to work.

D. Technical shortcomings.

In many cases prepared starts of the agents had to be postponed because of lack of specially outfitted airplanes or naval means of transportation. In case of the two big Estonian teams the lack of airplanes at disposal and the too long and complicated way of requesting these, were the causes why the salvage by air failed. The Soviets had too much time for their preparations, they possibly could make some inferences out of the way our men went to one lake, and of their stay there. So the batteries could be brought into position, and the airplane, which after long delay was sent out, was destroyed from ambush. Had the unit the airplanes at disposal, or could these have been received and sent out for rescue in due time, the salvage of these men could have succeeded and the airplane and the crew were not been lost. Different enterprises which can be done easily and without special risk if done in due time and profiting of the surprise the unexpected action is causing to the enemy, will be lost and extremely risky if started too late.

There was often not enough W/T sets available for teaching the techniques and the traffic to tens of advanced recruits. Units were trying to have the few new sets as soon as these were assembled in the central W/T workshop near Berlin and before other

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unit could have taken these. There was no help of ordering the sets in due time: every unit claimed the first priority of its need. So I had personally to travel from Tallinn to Berlin for receiving some few sets. I had to erect some sympathy with my Finnish uniform before I really had some. The same was with the A- and B-batteries for these sets. The sets themselves were not robust enough to remain intact in the often clumsy hands of our Russian volunteers. The Finnish W/T sets, which we used in summer 1941, were technically not quite reliable - the valves of the receiver burned out occasionally, after a too short period of work. There was not enough time to test every set duly before the start (during a longer period) and thus the defects could not be removed. One of our agents, who had used off all his reserve valves, had to use one occasional radioreceiver and, as we did not have any transmitters of modulated waves so we had to give our messages to the Finnish broadcasting station to be transmitted after a news program.

It is clear to every radio-operator, that he is helpless if he has no watch. But we never had enough watches to supply our many agents in training and those going out for work. So it often happened that a group of three men went out with one, in best cases with two watches only. And those they received were often of such a fragile construction that they lasted for some few days only in the hands of the Russian agents to whom it was in many cases the first time that they had a watch of their own.

The same was the situation with different other items of equipment, especially with compasses and pistols. An agent could seldom be supplied with a pistol which he could hide in his pocket for special occasions, if he had one already belonging to his equipment as a Russian officer (if he used such a legend). We never had pistols with silencers.

#### B. Lack of a general plan.

It seems that all the aforementioned shortcomings in qualified personnel and in technique was due to the lack of a general plan of activity of the intelligence work in such an immense scale, or to the unpreparedness of the organization to start active work on such a scale in 1941 already. There were no equipment in stock, there were no elaborated tuition plans. A new type of agent-W/T set was still under test, "Afo 3", and there seemed not to be any other sets ready for use in the special situation conditions.

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The stocks of the booty Russian agent's W/T set "Sever" (North), too, were not great, but these helped much, especially during the tuition period.

Later, too, there was no fixed plan of operation, at least not in the units with which I stood in contact during 1941/1942. Thank to the great activity of our leading officer hundreds of Russian volunteers were selected, brought together into our instruction camps and were taught. But there was no possibility to use these men: once there were no missions for them, and later there were no possibilities to send them out. In the same time other units lacked of taught personnel for the missions they had to carry out immediately. So we had to give our best men away. This all was done against the very fundamental principles of the security precautions, as if these were unknown to the leaders. Or - perhaps they thought to use the Soviet method of using agents and teaching them by hundreds? But, then too, they were not prepared to such work technically.

All these inefficiencies of the German intelligence could have been avoided, and the ideal solution could have been reached, if

- 1) the Germans had a sound policy guaranting and really giving independence to the freed nations,
- 2) they had enough time to prepare the enormous organization duly, organically as well as technically, using their best selected officers who would have done not only their duty but who would have enjoyed themselves doing this particular work of finest psychology,
- 3) they had used (if not enough own qualified officers available) some thoroughly checked officers of the "freed" nations without discriminating between these and the own officers. If in some cases such officers were to be used for work with recruits belonging to a third nation, then, if the equality of the officers of all these nations was not acknowledged reciprocally, then the officers under question had to be taken, uniformed and duly masked as German officers,
- 4) the units sending out and leading the agents on their work were technically prepared to respond to the grounded demands of the agents without delay.

Thus: -- sound policy,

-- best qualified personnel, own and alien - allied, bound by common cause of fight, common difficulties and common faith for victory, and

-- good planning.

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The principles mentioned above are still valid, and the mistakes made by the Germans have to be avoided in the future work.

The difficulties to be won have grown meanwhile. The reserve of persons, wherefrom the recruits can be selected, has shortened very much, if compared with the situation during the end of 1941. The security and the conditions of life and work of an agent in U.S.S.R. is much worse now than it was during World War II. His difficulties are immense if compared to those confronted by an agent on work somewhere in the Western World. An agent going to U.S.S.R. can hardly expect such a luck as a possibility of returning from there. Thus an agent, if he is not double-crossing, makes a stroke under his private life. To be able for this, he must have some higher stimuli than money or other wealth and good life awaiting him after his return. Those stimulating values can be of psychological character only.

We are fighting against the international communism. The best stimuli for that fight must come from the opposite, thus national, camp. The recruit has to feel that this work must be done for the rescue of his own people, his own nation suffocated by the international communists.

Thus the national feelings of a recruit receive the utmost importance. All must be done to cherish this feeling and not to hurt it. Different good promises only, will not do. The agent has to see acts, not to hear promises. The best solvable and the most indoctrinating are the acts which are in immediate contact with the recruit's tuition and preparation for his work. He must see and get convinced that really all will be done to enable his working, that the modern technical devices will be used to secure his safety and to lighten his work. He must be convinced, too, that if he will do his work well, then here he will have helpers not less determined to do a full work, thus, that his work will not be for nothing, but will really be used for the benefit of his country and people.

We are lucky so far, that we are not bound by dictated unsound policy. As we can use nationally guided people only, so we must use national policy, too. We may not hurt, e.g., the feelings of an Ukrainian by assimilating him with a Russian. But we cannot go too far with that differentiation. Therefore, if ever possible, never bind the enterprise with some inner-political group of a nation, the whole nation must be behind it, or it must be accep-

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table to the whole action, so it can join the surprise or move ment later. 08663

Remains to chose the best-qualified own workers and such belonging to the nationality of the recruits, who will have to instruct him and to care for him. These persons, own and alien, must be put into the situation enabling them to sacrifice the maximum of their psychic, moral and physical strength for that work, to do this with full devotion. For the aliens this will be possible only if they will be convinced themselves

- 1) in the necessity of the sacrifice which will be brought by the agent,
- 2) that fullest mutual trust is reigning between the Organization carrying the work and himself,
- 3) that this Organization is determined and able, and duly prepared to give the agent every possible help and alleviation,
- 4) - and - if they are free from special troubles of personal character.

Simultaneously with the preparations concerning the personnel, the plan of operation has to be build up.

The questions have to be answered:

- 1) what do we like to be done by the agents?
- 2) Which ways we could practically use, and which we will use for sending the agents to the working areas?
- 3) Which technical means of communication between the agents and the Organization can practically, and will be used?

Depending on these decisions, and on the personal qualities, capacities and knowledge of the agents (available recruits) the real tuition plan has to be build up.

26 February 1952.

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